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A CONVENIENT BLANKET OF SECRECY: THE OFT-CITED
BUT NONEXISTENT HOUSEKEEPING PRIVILEGE
William Bradley Russell, Jr.*
[The] "housekeeping" statute, destitute as it is of all vestige of
definitions and standards, is susceptible of being tortured, and has
been tortured, with judicial sanction, it must be admitted, into a
claim of privilege against disclosure and inspection so all-
encompassing that it may fairly be said that there is no hope of
obtaining inspection of a public record not specifically opened by
Congress except through the courtesy of the Government.'
INTRODUCTION
Federal agencies today often claim a privilege of confidentiality that is really no
privilege at all. These claims are based on a relatively unimportant "housekeeping"
statute that grants the heads of federal agencies the power to make regulations for
"the custody, use, and preservation" of agency records.2 The law on this matter is
widely misunderstood. Federal agencies often interpret this housekeeping statute
as granting a substantive privilege to withhold information. Indeed, there are many
valid reasons for a federal agency to claim a privilege. And the housekeeping
statute facilitates agency decisions about claims of privilege by allowing agencies
to make regulations requiring subordinates to report to decision-makers subpoenas
for agency documents.' The statute thus assures that only those approved by an
agency will make decisions about whether to comply with a subpoena or to assert
a claim of privilege. The housekeeping statute can do nothing more than this. If an
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2006. The author wishes to thank his
wife, Casey, for her love and support at every stage of the note-writing process. The author
is grateful also to his parents, and Sam, Hilda, Jim, and Michele for their comments on early
drafts of this note, and to the editors and staff of the Bill of Rights Journal for their hard
work.
' Availability of Information from Fed. Dep 'ts and Agencies: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov "t Operations (pt. 1), H. R., 84th Cong. 12 (1955) (statement
of Harold L. Cross, Freedom of Information Counsel, American Society of Newspaper
Editors).
2 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
United States ex rel. Touhyv. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462,468 (1951) ("When one considers
the variety of information contained in the files of any government department and the
possibilities of harm from unrestricted disclosure in court, the usefulness, indeed the
necessity, of centralizing determination as to whether subpoenas duces tecum will be
willingly obeyed or challenged is obvious.").
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agency is to withhold documents from the courts, it must do so in compliance with
the law of privilege.4
In 1789, the first U.S. Congress gave cabinet secretaries authority over the
records of their departments.5 The statutes granting this authority were not grants
of a confidentiality privilege.6 Rather, the authority was merely a housekeeping
matter, "enacted to help General Washington get his administration underway by
spelling out the authority for executive officials to set up offices and file Govern-
ment documents., 7 Over the years, this authority has been invoked by executive
agencies to conceal information from the public and from the courts.8 It has been
used as "a convenient blanket to hide anything Congress may have neglected or
refused to include under specific secrecy laws."9 It has come to be known as the
"housekeeping privilege."
10
In fact, though, the housekeeping statute confers no privilege at all." Currently
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 301, the housekeeping statute actually grants executive agencies
the power only to centralize control over agency records in the head of the agency. 2
4 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2002). There are other ways that the government can avoid
divulging information, of course, but these are the same methods that are available to private
parties. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Under this rule, a court may protect a person from discovery
that is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that
is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive," or whose burden or expense
"outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and
the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues," Id. See also Exxon
Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
background rules of discovery are adequate to protect the government's interests in conserving
resources).
' See, e.g., Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 29 (Department of Foreign Affairs); Act
of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 50 (Department of War). The relevant language of both
statutes is the same: "[T]he Secretary for the department.., shall... be entitled to have the
custody and charge of all records, books and papers in the office of the Secretary...
6 H.R. Rep. No. 85-1461, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352.
7 Id. at 3352.
8 Id. at 3352-53.
9 Id. at 3353.
10 Gregory S. Coleman, Note, Touhy and the Housekeeping Privilege: Dead but not
Buried?, 70 TEX. L. REv. 685, 685 (1992).
"Id.
12 United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462,467-68 (1951); see also Recent
Cases, 108 HARv. L. REV. 965,967-68 (1995) (discussing Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't
of Interior, 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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It grants agency heads the power to promulgate regulations for the handling of agency
records.'3 Such regulations are binding on agency employees, but they are no more
binding on the courts than the internal regulations of any employer. 4
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a federal agency employee cannot
be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum for
agency records when the employee's failure to comply was required by agency regu-
lations.1 5 The case was called United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen,16 and it addressed
the problem of agency employees stuck between court orders for information and
agency regulations requiring that such information be withheld." The Court held that
an agency head may validly withdraw from employees the power to decide whether
or not to comply with a subpoena.'8 The Court did not hold that an agency head could
promulgate regulations that would themselves create a privilege to withhold agency
records from the courts. 9 Federal agencies may indeed have numerous bases for
asserting a privilege to withhold information, but such a privilege is not founded on
the housekeeping statute.
Unfortunately, the Touhy doctrine that developed in the years following this
decision bore little resemblance to the Touhy decision.20 Rather, the doctrine has
'3 The housekeeping statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), states:
The head of an Executive department or military department may
prescribe regulations for the government ofhis department, the conduct
of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and
the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.
This section does not authorize withholding information from the
public or limiting the availability of records to the public.
A private employer may write regulations requiring employees to consult with
someone in'authority before taking legal action on behalf of the employer, such as complying
with a subpoena. But those regulations do not create law that is binding on the courts. See
Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1191 n.44 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("A nondiscretionary
instruction from a private employer to a private employee does not ordinarily create an
enforceable legal duty running to third parties."). Similarly, the internal housekeeping reg-
ulations of a federal agency govern the official actions of agency employees, but they do not
bind the courts. Indeed, Congress did not, in the housekeeping statute, delegate to federal
agencies the authority to create their own privileges. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
"5 Touhy, 340 U.S. at 467-68.
16 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
17 Id.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 467; id. at 472-73 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter clarified that
the Court did not decide whether the head of the agency himself could refuse to comply with
a subpoena to produce agency records. Id. An agency head in such a situation would have
to claim a valid privilege in order to avoid such a subpoena. Id.
20 Milton Hirsch, "The Voice ofAdjuration ": The Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory
Process Fifty Years After United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 81
(2002).
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become the basis for federal agency assertions of a general privilege to withhold
information when no specific privilege is available."
The housekeeping statute grants no evidentiary privilege to federal agencies; it
confers power that may only be exercised internally within executive agencies.22 In
practice, however, the housekeeping statute is regularly used as an unqualified
privilege, allowing federal agencies to decide whether or not to comply with sub-
poenas. This presents dangerous problems for our system of separation of powers
because, under our system, the judiciary is supposed to decide matters of privilege.23
Moreover, this situation presents a problem for the rule of law because powerful
executive agencies can flout the law with impunity. This Note presents the true law
and discusses the problems with disregarding it.
Executive privilege is essential to the operation of government. There are many
matters that the government must keep in confidence. However, the housekeeping
"privilege" purports to allow the executive to circumvent the standard method of
adjudicating claims of executive privilege. This Note suggests that a withholding
under the housekeeping "privilege" should automatically grant the court the power
to decide the claim as if it were a claim of executive privilege (as at least one circuit
has held).24 Perhaps, in keeping with the standard method of adjudicating such
claims, the executive privilege claim will fail unless the head of the executive
department joins the litigation and makes a formal claim of privilege.
This Note argues that the federal agency practice of standing on the house-
keeping statute as a justification for refusing to comply with a subpoena is not in
accord with the law. This Note is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the
history of the housekeeping statute. This part argues that the statute was never
meant to authorize executive agencies to determine for themselves whether or not
to comply with a subpoena. The section argues that agencies have used the house-
keeping statute as a privilege to withhold, despite even an amendment to the statute
clarifying that the statute does not confer such a privilege. Finally, Part I discusses
the current state of the housekeeping privilege, including the fact that the continued
existence of the housekeeping privilege relies to some extent on the cost of
challenging agency decisions.
21 Coleman, supra note 10, at 687.
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). The statute confers authority only over the affairs of the
agency.
23 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) ("[I]t is the province and duty
of this Court to 'say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this
case." (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
24 See NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961).
[W]hen a party has filed a request for evidence or testimony and the
request can be properly denied only if the evidence or testimony is
privileged, the question of privilege is as squarely raised by an
unexplained refusal to comply as by an.express claim of privilege, and
the court must decide the question.
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Part II discusses the real privilege to withhold: executive privilege. This part
discusses proper claims of executive privilege and the rationale behind the privilege.
The part also explains the proper procedure for claims of executive privilege.
Finally, Part II explains that the standard for upholding an agency decision to
withhold is much lower under the misunderstood housekeeping privilege than under
a proper claim of executive privilege; this system undermines the law of executive
privilege.
Part III explores the problems with misuse of the housekeeping statute. This
part discusses the problem this misuse poses for the constitutional principle of the
separation of powers. It also explores the tension with the common law principle
of everyman's evidence. Further, it discusses the problem for the rule of law if
executive agencies are able to create their own evidentiary privileges and flout the
courts.
Finally, Part IV of this Note suggests that courts confronted with claims of the
"housekeeping privilege" evaluate such claims as claims of executive privilege. This
accords with the purpose of the housekeeping statute as a means of centralizing
authority in the head of the department. Moreover, this eliminates an extralegal meth-
od of enforcing the de facto housekeeping privilege: the high cost of bringing and win-
ning a claim against the head of an executive department or the department itself.
I. HISTORY OF THE HOUSEKEEPING PRIVILEGE
A. 1789 to the Modem Era
Congress originally granted federal agencies the power to control their records
as part of the statutes that created those agencies.25 This was just a housekeeping
matter; having established an agency, Congress gave the head of that agency the
authority over its records. The statute was not intended to grant a privilege of con-
fidentiality. As explained by an expert witness before the Special Subcommittee on
Government Information:
There was no historymaking debate over [the housekeeping
statute] because it was not a historymaking statute, it was not a
historymaking bill, it was not a historymaking proposal. If it
had proposed secrecy it would have been historymaking. But it
didn't. It was just a housekeeping statute, and as such raised none
of the great issues that would have aroused Madison, Jefferson,
Mason, and the rest of the statesmen who put so much trust in
popular rights to information.26
25 See, e.g., Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 4, 1 Stat. 29; Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 4,
1 Stat. 50.
26 H.R. Rep. No. 85-1461, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352, 3353 (citation
2005]
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The statute was first codified in 1875.27 The grants of authority to the heads of
federal agencies to control the records of these agencies were consolidated into one
statutory section granting all federal agency heads authority over the records of their
respective agencies.28 Just two years later, this code section was used for the first
time to justify withholding federal agency records. 29
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided that a court
could not punish a federal employee for failing to turn over subpoenaed agency
records. In Boske v. Comingore,30 a state tax collector wanted to use federal tax
records as evidence against a distiller of alcohol. 3' Treasury Department regulations
prohibited the release of such records.32 Federal law also made it a crime for any
federal treasury agent to divulge tax information a. 3  The state court ordered the
federal agent to turn over the tax records, and the agent refused pursuant to the regu-
lations of the Treasury Department.34 The state court held the agent in contempt. 35
The Supreme Court determined that the agent could not be held in contempt for
complying with the valid regulations of the Treasury Department.36 The Secretary
of the Treasury was held to have the authority to withdraw from his subordinates the
power to determine how Treasury records would be used.37 It is notable that, had
the Secretary of the Treasury himself been ordered to produce the records, the
Secretary would have been entirely within his rights to refuse to produce them.
Although the Court never explicitly said this, the records would have been protected
by executive privilege.
omitted).
27 Id. at 3352.
28 See HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOw: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC
RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 311 n.3 (1953) (noting that the housekeeping statute, as originally
codified, was derived from the statutes that created the various cabinet departments in 1789).
29 H.R. Rep. No. 85-1461, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352, 3352; see also 15
Op. Att'y Gen. 342 (1877) (advising that the housekeeping statute grants agency heads the
power to withhold documents from the press unless some other statute makes the documents
public records). The opinion ofthe Attorney General, Charles Devens, is not noteworthy. He
merely states that an agency head who is the legal owner of documents possesses the same
right to withhold the documents as any owner of documents. Id. at 342-43. Unlike the courts,
the press has no special power to force the production of documents. Id. at 345. Though this
opinion advised that the housekeeping statute authorized withholding, it did not advise that
the statute created a privilege to withhold documents under subpoena. Id. at 343-45.
30 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
1 Id. at 462.
32 Id. at 467.
" Id. at 462.
14 Id. at 462-63.
31 Id. at 463.
36 Id. at 470.
37 Id.
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The papers in question, copies of which were sought from the
appellee, were the property of the United States, and were in his
official custody under a regulation forbidding him to permit their
use except for purposes relating to the collection of the revenues
of the United States. Reasons of public policy may well have
suggested the necessity, in the interest of the Government, of not
allowing access to the records in the offices of collectors of
internal revenue, except as might be directed by the Secretary of
the Treasury. The interests of persons compelled, under the
revenue laws, to furnish information as to their private business
affairs would often be seriously affected if the disclosures so
made were not properly guarded.3"
The Court thus noted the existence of a privilege to withhold information in the
public interest. If the information were liable to disclosure, taxpayers might be
reluctant to report the details of their private businesses, and the government's
ability to effectively collect revenue would be impaired.
In 1951, the Supreme Court decided a similar case, United States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen.39 In that case, a prison inmate alleged in a habeas corpus action that an
FBI agent had documents that would be helpful to the inmate's defense.' The trial
court ordered the production of the documents, but the agent, in compliance with
Justice Department regulations, refused to produce the documents.4' The Seventh
Circuit released the agent, holding that the Justice Department regulation, authorized
by the housekeeping statute, "'confers upon the Department of Justice the privilege
of refusing to produce.'" 42 This demonstrated a misapprehension of the law. Unless
the housekeeping statute was interpreted as granting a general privilege of confi-
dentiality, there is no way that a regulation promulgated by a department head could
have the effect of creating an evidentiary privilege. If the statute did in fact grant
such a general privilege, the department head could make a conclusive determina-
tion not to produce records.
The Supreme Court refused to consider the issue of whether the housekeeping
statute conferred a privilege:
Among the questions duly presented by the petition for certiorari
was whether it is permissible for the Attorney General to make
a conclusive determination not to produce records and whether
38 Id. at 469-70.
39 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
40 Id. at 464-65.
41 Id. at 465.
42 Id. at 465 (quoting United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 321, 327 (7th Cir.
1950)).
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
his subordinates in accordance with the order may lawfully
decline to produce them in response to a subpoena duces tecum.
We find it unnecessary, however to consider the ultimate
reach of the authority of the Attorney General to refuse to
produce at a court's order the government papers in his posses-
sion, for the case as we understand it raises no question as to the
power of the Attorney General himself to make such a refusal."
Instead, the Supreme Court determined that the Attorney General could "validly
withdraw from his subordinates the power to release department papers." This was
a correct statement of the law. It did not recognize any housekeeping privilege; it
only determined that the courts would have to order the head, rather than an
employee, of an executive department to produce department records. This accords
completely with the housekeeping statute, which says that the department head is
the person who has custody of department records."
This case gave birth to the Touhy doctrine, which bears little resemblance to the
holding of the case. "The decision in Touhy is often cited for the proposition that
an agency head is free to withhold evidence from a court without a specific claim
of privilege."
Despite Justice Frankfurter's best efforts, the holding in
Touhy has not been so narrowly construed or applied. Because
the Supreme Court did little or no analysis of the problem before
it, most lower courts that have been faced with a similar set of
facts have interpreted the Touhy opinion as authority to deny the
contested discovery without looking at the circumstances of the
particular situation before it. Unfortunately, this has allowed
agency heads to promulgate blanket non-disclosure regulations
which forbid subordinates from complying with discovery
requests while avoiding review of their own actions. This prac-
tice has persisted, with relatively little change or development,
for nearly forty-five years.47
41 Id. at 467.
4Id
4' 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
4 Coleman, supra note 10, at 687. See also Hirsch, supra note 20, at 83 ("[Touhy] is the
case most cited by both executive-branch agencies in support of their regulations and by
courts confronted by a demand for evidence withheld in reliance upon such regulations.").
47 John T. Richmond, Jr., Note, Forty-Five Years Since United States ex rel. Touhy v.
Ragen: The Time is Ripe for a Change to a More Functional Approach, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
173, 181 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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In 1958, Congress attempted to address the misunderstanding of the housekeep-
ing statute by amending it to make clear that the statute does not authorize with-
holding information.48 By this, the Congress attempted to return the housekeeping
statute to its original intent.49 But the new amendment had little effect on federal
agency refusals to produce information.5"
Although some commentators believed that this amendment was
intended to reverse, or indeed, that it did reverse the Touhy
doctrine, others were skeptical of such conclusions .... Irre-
spective of whether Congress intended to overrule Touhy ....
courts have continued to apply and expand the immunity from
testimony beyond what was allowed in Touhy."
The 1958 amendment may have been passed to overrule the housekeeping privilege,
but it seems not to have had that effect.
It has been written that the 1958 amendment eliminated the
housekeeping privilege, and that the only vestige of the doctrine
left is an agency's procedural discretion to determine when to
assert a privilege. While those positions follow logically the
1958 amendment, most courts that have addressed the issue have
not recognized the demise of the Touhy doctrine. Indeed, time
has shown that although the 1958 amendment "knocked the
judicially sanctioned prop out from under the bureaucratic
privilege claims," it has done little to stem the tide of claims of
Touhy privilege flowing from govemment agencies. Most, if not
all, commentators agree that the amendment was intended to
abrogate the de facto privilege that had arisen under various
housekeeping regulations. The proposition for which Touhy is
often cited - that a government agency may withhold docu-
48 H.R. Rep. No. 85-1461, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352. The amendment
added one sentence to the statute: "This section does not authorize withholding information
from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public." Id. at 3553.
49 Id. at 3352.
'0 Jason C. Grech, Note, Exxon Shipping, the Power to Subpoena Federal Agency
Employees, and the Housekeeping Statute: Cleaning Up the Housekeeping Privilege for the
Chimney-Sweeper's Benefit, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1137, 1144 (1996) ("Although the
language of the [1958 housekeeping statute] amendment was direct in its demand for
openness, the addition had little, if any, effect on federal agency responses to discovery
requests.").
" Robert R. Kiesel, Note, Every Man's Evidence and Ivory Tower Agencies: How May
a Civil Litigant Obtain Testimony from an Employee of a Nonparty Federal Agency?, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1647, 1655-56 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
2005]
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ments or testimony at its discretion - simply is not good law
and hasn't been since 1958.52
The Touhy doctrine has been approved as a privilege to conserve the resources
of federal agencies.5 3 If agency employees were forced to spend a great deal of time
in court, their agencies would be deprived of their services. This protection of
agency resources is unnecessary, however. If the need is slight for the testimony of
federal employees, and the cost to the federal agency of supplying the testimony is
great, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already protect the federal agency from
the burden of supplying the testimony.54 These are the same rules that apply to
private parties as well.5 The court must balance the interests for and against the
production of information in cases where the cost of complying with a subpoena
becomes an issue.56 Yet, the Touhy doctrine has allowed federal agencies to make
their own determinations on this question.1
7
2 Coleman, supra note 10, at 688-89 (quoting EEOC v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D.N.M. 1974)) (footnotes omitted).
53 See Moore v. Armour Pharm. Co., 129 F.R.D. 551, 556 (N.D. Ga. 1990), aff'd, 927
F.2d 1194 (1lth Cir. 1991).
14 FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) (explaining that a court may limit discovery if it determines
that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed dis-
covery in resolving the issues"); see also Kiesel, supra note 51, at 1669-70.
Certain safeguards against overly burdensome discovery... already
exist in federal practice. Under the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, only relevant information may be sought
through discovery and overly burdensome requests may be limited or
denied by the trial court. These rules limit discovery in such a manner
that any request that passes their tests should be allowed unless the
information sought is privileged. When a court issues a subpoena to an
agency employee, it already has determined that the requested infor-
mation is relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant information
and that the request is not overly burdensome. Thus, a separate agency
determination of the requested testimony's burden on the public fisc
seems superfluous. Nonparty federal agencies should stand as others
under the rules governing discovery, with the limitation, of course, that
privileges unique to the government are recognized. Furthermore, when
the agency considers the costs of testimony, its analysis is one-sided;
the agency has no means by which to assess the need of the litigant for
the testimony sought.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
56 See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2).
5 See Kiesel, supra note 51, at 1668.
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For example, in Moore v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,"8 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia held that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services could decide not to allow employees of the Center for Disease Control to
testify in private litigation if the Secretary determined that the testimony would be
too burdensome. 9 The court itself did not balance the interests of the Center for
Disease Control with the interests of the litigants. Instead, it held that, under the
housekeeping statute, "the head of an executive department may prohibit an em-
ployee of his department from giving testimony in private litigation.'
Other courts have properly applied the Touhy doctrine, though, holding that the
housekeeping privilege cannot justify withholding information from the courts.61
In United States v. Reynolds,62 the widows of civilians killed in the crash of a
military airplane sued the government in tort.63 The plaintiffs moved to require the
Air Force to produce the official accident report.' The Air Force defended by
asserting that regulations promulgated under the housekeeping statute made the
reports privileged.65 The trial court refused to accept that argument and ordered
production. 66 Then the Secretary of the Air Force made a formal claim of the
military secrets privilege.67 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
the claim of the housekeeping privilege was unavailing:
[T]he trial judge was in no position to decide that the report was
privileged until there had been a formal claim of privilege. Thus
it was entirely proper to rule initially that petitioner had shown
probable cause for discovery of the documents. Thereafter,
when the formal claim of privilege was filed by the Secretary of
the Air Force, under circumstances indicating a reasonable possi-
bility that military secrets were involved, there was certainly a
sufficient showing of privilege to cut off further demand for the
documents on the showing of necessity for its compulsion that
had then been made.68
58 129 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 553.
61 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't
of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Section 301 does not allow federal
agencies to withhold government information against a valid subpoena); F.A.C., Inc. v.
Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida, 188 F.R.D. 181 (D.P.R. 1999).
62 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
63 Id. at 3.
64 id
65 Id. at 3-4.
66 Id. at 4.
67 Id. at 4-5.
68 Id. at 10-11.
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Thus, the Court recognized that the housekeeping privilege was no privilege at all.
When the Air Force first claimed a right to withhold on the authority of the house-
keeping statute, the Court stated that the Air Force had no such privilege. 69 It was
only when the Air Force lodged a formal claim of executive privilege that the Court
upheld the refusal to produce the accident report.70
B. The Housekeeping Privilege Today: A Privilege in Fact Rather than in Law
Numerous challenges face litigants who wish to obtain information from an
executive agency. Regulations promulgated under the housekeeping statute, in
conjunction with the immunity of federal employees from contempt of court sanc-
tions under Touhy, create a de facto privilege to withhold any information that a
federal agency determines to withhold. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7
offers some hope for review of an agency decision, but courts have not granted relief
unless the agency decision to withhold was not made in accordance with the
agency's own policies.72 Because most federal agencies follow a general policy of
nondisclosure,73 it is extremely difficult to show that a decision to withhold was not
69 Id.
70 Id.
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000).
72 COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding agency
decision to withhold where agency acted reasonably and complied with its own regulations);
Davis Enters. v. U.S. EPA, 877 F.2d 1181, 1186 (3d Cir. 1989) (same); Houston Bus. J. v.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208, 1212 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating
that federal courts will use the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to review agency decisions
to prevent employee testimony). But see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (stating that relief is
authorized, inter alia, when agency action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law; [or] in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right" (emphasis added)).
In both COMSAT and Davis Enterprises, the party requesting disclosure did not
challenge the legality of the agency policies themselves. See COMSAT, 190 F.3d at 277
("COMSAT does not contest the underlying validity of NSF's Touhy regulations."); Davis
Enters., 877 F.2d at 1184 ("Appellants have not challenged the validity of the EPA's power
to promulgate regulations which grant the agency discretion to determine whether to comply
with subpoenas or requests for employee testimony in private litigation."). For that reason,
the courts had no occasion to consider whether the agency actions were "not in accordance
with law" or outside of statutory authorization. In calling to light the litigants' failure to
question the legality of the regulations, the courts hinted that meaningful review of agency
decisions to withhold would require a challenge to the regulations themselves. That is, if
regulations allow an agency to withhold without a privilege, a disappointed litigant would
have to challenge the regulations themselves. Accordingly, a litigant wishing to make use
of a meaningful standard of review under the APA might find availing a challenge to the
regulations themselves.
71 See, e.g., Federal Labor Relations Authority, 5 C.F.R. § 2411.11 (2005).
No . . . officer or employee ... shall produce or present any files,
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based on agency policy. According to one commentator, only three agencies have
policies for the release of information that are roughly coterminous with the
boundaries of executive privilege.74 Moreover, the time and expense required to
bring an APA suit ensure that it will often be impossible for a litigant to obtain
evidence from a recalcitrant federal agency.75
The courts have held that the proper method of challenging federal agency
decisions to withhold information is by a collateral suit against the agency itself."
These collateral suits are brought under the APA77 against the agency itself - not
against individual employees of the agency. Thus, the challenges circumvent the
problem of Touhy, i.e., forcing an agency employee to decide between complying
with a court order and obeying the commands of his employer. These lawsuits,
documents, reports, memoranda, or records.., or testify in behalf of
any party to any cause pending... in any court... with respect to any
information, facts, or other matter to their knowledge in their official
capacity... whether in answer to a subpena [sic] ... or otherwise,
without... written consent ....
Id. See also Office of Admin., Executive Office of the President, 5 C.F.R. § 2502.31 (2005)
("No employee.., shall, in response to a demand of a court.. . disclose any information or
produce any material acquired as part of the performance of his official status without the
prior approval of the Deputy Director.").
" See Kiesel, supra note 51, at 1656-57 ("[O]nly the regulations of the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Agency for International Development provide
standards that comport with any traditional common law notion of privilege." (footnotes
omitted)).
75 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 780 n.1 1(9th Cir. 1994)
("[C]ollateral APA proceedings can be costly, time-consuming, inconvenient to litigants, and
may 'effectively eviscerate[]' any right to the requested testimony." (quoting In re Boeh, 25
F.3d 761, 770 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original)).
76 Boeh, 25 F.3d at 764 n.3; Davis, 877 F.2d at 1185-86; Hayes Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't
of Navy, 685 F. Supp. 228, 230 (M.D. Ala. 1987); see also Coleman, supra note 10, at
691-94; Richmond, supra note 47, at 184 n.71.
77 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06. See COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 277 (citing United States v.
Williams, 170 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999)). In Williams, the court explained that the APA was
the appropriate avenue for review of an agency decision not to comply with a state court
subpoena. 170 F.3d at 434. The COMSAT court cited Williams for the proposition that the
APA was the only waiver of sovereign immunity that would allow review of an agency
decision to withhold. 190 F.3d at 277. The COMSA Topinion then criticized the Ninth Circuit
for allowing judicial review of an agency decision to withhold because the Ninth Circuit's
judicial review did not apply the deferential standards of the APA. Id. There is a significant
difference between the subpoena in Williams and the subpoena at issue in the Ninth Circuit
case, Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d 774. The subpoena in Williams was issued from a state court,
Williams, 170 F.3d at 432, while the subpoena before the Ninth Circuit issued out of a federal
proceeding, Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 776. While Williams might have held that the APA
is the only waiver of sovereign immunity effective to review a refusal to comply with a state
court subpoena, it did not hold that an agency's decision to ignore a federal subpoena was
reviewable only under the APA. Williams, 170 F.3d at 433-34.
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therefore, also do not implicate the holding in Touhy;7 8 that holding was only that
the head of an executive department could issue regulations withdrawing from
employees the "power to release department papers. 79
Actions brought under the APA also sidestep another problem: sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity prevents state courts from enforcing subpoenas
against the federal government.80 If a state court seeks to compel a federal employee
to comply with a subpoena, the federal employee can remove the matter to federal
court.81 The federal court will recognize that the state court had no jurisdiction to
compel compliance from a federal employee.82 Because federal courts on removal
derive their jurisdiction from the state court from which the matter was removed, the
federal court will also determine that it lacks jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena.
Sovereign immunity also prevents a private litigant from compelling the federal
government to do anything, except where the federal government has waived this
right.8' Where it agrees to be a party to a lawsuit, the federal government waives
any sovereign immunity objections to the equal application of the rules of pro-
cedure.85 In such cases, the government agrees to be bound by the same rules of
procedure as bind other litigants. Therefore, the federal government as a party
would be bound by the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, just
as any other litigant. The federal government would also waive sovereign immunity
under the APA.86 Even where the noncompliant federal agency is not a party to the
matter in which a subpoena is issued, therefore, review of its decision not to comply
will not be barred by a claim of sovereign immunity.
78 See Exxon Shipping, 34 F.3d at 777 ("Here, unlike in Touhy, the agencies themselves
are named defendants. Thus, the ultimate question of federal agencies' authority to withhold
discovery, including deposition testimony, is squarely at issue.").
9 United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467 (1951).
80 Smith v. Cromer, 159 F.3d 875,879 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Where an agency has not waived
its immunity to suit, the state court (and the federal court on removal) lacks jurisdiction to
proceed against a federal employee acting pursuant to agency direction."); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442 (2000) (authorizing federal officers sued in state court for actions taken under color
of their federal offices to remove the suits to federal court).
81 See Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 68 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing a federal
employee's removal to federal court of a state court subpoena proceeding).
82 See id. at 70.
83 See id.
84 E.g., Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983); Semon v. Stewart, 374 F.3d
184, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).
85 Al Fayed v. CIA, 229 F.3d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Where the government is a
party to a suit it is, unsurprisingly, subject to the [Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure]."
(citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958))).
86 Id. at 275 (explaining that the federal government waived its claim to sovereign
immunity for actions not seeking monetary relief by a 1976 amendment to the Administrative
Procedure Act).
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There is some question as to whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity can be
circumvented in any other way.17 In Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Department
of Interior, the Ninth Circuit refused to hold that sovereign immunity protects non-
party federal agencies from valid federal court subpoenas.8 9 This was based on the
principle of separation of powers, which would be violated if the executive branch
could use sovereign immunity to shield itself from the judiciary, a co-equal branch."
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that such a conception of sovereign immunity
would impair the "'right to every man's evidence.""'9 The court thus concluded that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should govem discovery against federal agencies,
even when they are not parties.92
Other courts, however, have held that the APA is the only waiver of sovereign
immunity for non-party federal agencies.93 The Second Circuit addressed the ques-
tion in United States EPA v. General Electric Co.9' In that case, the court held "that
the government may not be subject to judicial proceedings unless there has been an
express waiver of its sovereign immunity." ' The Second Circuit found that the only
such express waiver "that would permit a court to require a response to a subpoena
in an action in which the government is not a party is found in the APA."96 The court
further held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery do not
contain the required waiver.97 In COMSAT Corp. v. National Science Foundation,"
the Fourth Circuit agreed that the only waiver of sovereign immunity effective to
require the federal government to answer a subpoena was the APA.99 The court
stated, "When the government is not a party, the APA provides the sole avenue for
review of an agency's refusal to permit its employees to comply with subpoenas. ''
There is logic in the position of the Exxon Shipping court that separation of
powers prevents one branch of the federal government from declaring itself immune
87 Id. at 275 (noting that the law on this matter is "in some disarray").
88 34 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
89 Id. at 778 (distinguishing between state court subpoenas and federal court subpoenas).
90 Id.
9' Id. at 779 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
92 Id.
93 Al Fayed v. CIA, 229 F.3d 273,275-76 (D.C. Cir 2000) ("[A]t least two circuits, the
Second and Fourth, have taken a more restrictive approach. Rejecting Exxon and viewing
[the Administrative Procedure Act] as the only applicable waiver of sovereign immunity,
they have applied the [Act].").
94 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1999).
9' Id. at 598.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 190 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1999).
99 Id. at 274.
100 Id.
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from another branch.'0' At bottom, both the executive and the judiciary are at the
same level of sovereign power. It is nonsensical to declare that one organ of the
sovereign is immune from another.' However, this may not adequately answer the
claim that sovereign immunity shields the federal executive from a subpoena issued
by the federal judiciary. After all, all judicial proceedings are conducted by the
power of the court. When a plaintiff sues a defendant, for example, it is by the
power of the court that the defendant is compelled to answer. It is not the private
plaintiff who commands the attention of the defendant. Yet sovereign immunity
protects the sovereign from lawsuits by private citizens despite the fact that it is the
power of the court that would command the sovereign as defendant to answer the
complaint. If the simple fact of equality of power between the federal executive and
the federal judiciary were enough to abrogate the defense of sovereign immunity,
it would seem to abrogate that defense in all cases, including those in which the
defense is unquestionably valid. The essential difference may lie in the fact that
courts enforce subpoenas in aid of their own truth-seeking function; therefore, such
subpoenas may be said to issue on the courts' behalf. While a court commands a
defendant's attention on behalf of a plaintiff, a court demands evidence on its own
behalf, in aid of its own essential function.
If the APA is the only way to challenge an agency decision not to produce
documents, agencies are able to create their own privileges. Under the housekeep-
ing statute, agencies have the authority to write policies for the production of doc-
uments in response to subpoenas.'0 3 Under the deferential standard of the APA, a
litigant who has been rebuffed in an attempt to obtain documents can only prevail
against an agency if the agency withheld the documents in contravention of the
agency's own policies."° Therefore, agencies are able to use the housekeeping
101 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dept. Of Interior, 34 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 1994).
102 Hirsch, supra note 20, at 104. Hirsch states:
When a state, acting through its court, attempts to exercise its visitorial
powers upon an agent or agency of the United States, the issue of
sovereign immunity appears in bold relief. When the United States
government, acting through its court, attempts to exercise its visitorial
powers upon its own agent or agency, the issue of sovereign immunity
is more difficult to discern. There is an isonomy between the judicial
branch that issues the subpoena and the executive branch that receives
it. The power that vivifies one is the power that vivifies the other. It is
gibberish to say that the federal sovereign is "immune" from itself.
Id.
'03 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
"o' COMSAT Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269,277-78 (4th Cir. 1999) (approving
the National Science Foundation's refusal- to comply with subpoenas, where "[a]cting in
accordance with the procedures mandated by its regulations, NSF reached an entirely
reasonable decision to refuse compliance with [the] document subpoenas."). It appears no
court has yet upheld a challenge under the APA to the validity of agency regulations
requiring nondisclosure. However, it is likely that the APA would authorize such a challenge.
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statute as authority to write regulations forbidding compliance with subpoenas.
Those regulations are then used as the touchstone, under the APA's deferential
standard, for determining whether an agency has improperly failed to comply with
a subpoena. In essence, agencies cite the housekeeping statute as authority to create
privileges to withhold. And when they have followed these housekeeping-statute-
authorized regulations in determining not to comply with subpoenas, the agencies
are entitled to prevail if their decisions are reviewed under the APA's deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. While the law of executive privilege might
authorize withholding in certain circumstances, the APA's deferential standard does
not question whether those circumstances were present; it asks only whether
executive agencies followed their own procedures in deciding to withhold.
For example, if a federal agency promulgated regulations requiring that no
information ever be produced in response to a subpoena, that agency's refusal to
comply with a subpoena would survive review under the APA's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.105 Even if the information were clearly not subject to a claim
of privilege, the agency would act in conformity with its own regulations by
refusing to produce the information. And a court will only overturn an agency
decision not to comply with a subpoena if the decision is not made according to the
agency's own regulations."° Therefore, under the APA's deferential review, the
agency refusal to produce would be upheld notwithstanding that the law of
executive privilege does not permit withholding.
The law of privilege is further frustrated by the cost in time and money of
obtaining review of an agency determination to withhold. In Exxon Shipping, for
example, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged "that collateral APA proceedings can be
costly, time-consuming, inconvenient to litigants, and may 'effectively eviscerate[]'
any right to the requested [information]."'0 7
The Department of Justice regulations are a good example of regulations that
bear some relationship to the law of privilege. Codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.21, et
seq., these regulations require that the recipient of a subpoena for information
acquired within the scope of the recipient's employment with the Department notify
a superior.0 8 The superior will then begin the process of determining whether or not
to comply with the subpoena. The regulations list six factors relevant to a possible
See supra note 72.
05 The APA likely also includes a more searching standard of review. If an agency
decision is in accord with the agency's own regulations - and is therefore not "arbitrary and
capricious" - a disappointed litigant may challenge the validity of the agency's regulations.
See supra note 72.
06 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
'07 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dept. Of Interior, 34 F.3d*774, 780 n.1 1(9th Cir. 1994)
(first alteration in original) (quoting In re Boeh, 23 F.3d 761,770 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris,
J., dissenting)).
'0' 28 C.F.R. § 16.22(a) (2004).
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claim of privilege, to be considered in making the determination." 9 These factors
mandate consideration of specific national security interests,"0 and of the law en-
forcement investigatory privilege,"' among other privileges." 2
By contrast, the Department of Transportation regulations bear little relationship
to the law of executive privilege. The regulations require that a Department em-
ployee refuse to give testimony or produce records "unless authorized."' '13 The cri-
teria by which those empowered to grant authorization determine whether testimony
or record production will be authorized are not clearly set out. 1 4 However, the
regulations do state broad purposes that are not in accord with the law of executive
privilege, including the conservation of Department resources.' 15
II. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
It is often necessary to the accomplishment of some worthy objective of the
government that certain matters be kept secret. For that reason, the courts have long
held that the government has a privilege with respect to matters for which the public
interest requires secrecy. 6 This privilege can be divided into two broad categories:
"o Id. § 16.26. The six factors are (1) whether "[d]isclosure would violate a [specific]
statute... or a rule of procedure," (2) whether "[d]isclosure would violate a specific regu-
lation," (3) whether "[d]isclosure would reveal classified information," (4) whether "[d]isclo-
sure would reveal a confidential source or informant," (5) whether disclosure would compro-
mise secret law enforcement techniques, and (6) whether "[d]isclosure would improperly
[compromise a] trade secret[ ]." Id.
no Id. § 16.26(b)(3).
"' Id. § 16.26(b)(4-5).
112 Id. § 16.26(a)(2) (requiring consideration of "the relevant substantive law concerning
privilege").
113 49 C.F.R. § 9.5 (2004).
114 Id.
"' Id. § 9.1 (b) (stating that the regulations' purposes are to conserve resources, keep the
government out of private disputes or controversial issues not related to its function, and
protect confidential information).
16 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); see also Boske v. Comingore, 177
U.S. 459 (1900) (recognizing that the public interest requires the secrecy of revenue infor-
mation); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (noting that the public interest occa-
sionally requires secrecy at the expense of a full judicial consideration of a dispute).
In Totten, the Supreme Court stated the general principle
that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of
justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting
which it will not allow the confidence to be violated. On this principle,
suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the
confidences of the confessional, or those between husband and wife,
or of communications by a client to his counsel for professional advice,
or of a patient to his physician for a similar purpose. Much greater
reason exists for the application of the principle to cases of contract for
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an absolute privilege and a qualified privilege. The government has an absolute
privilege for the protection of state secrets." 7 The government has only a qualified
privilege of secrecy for the protection of the public interest in other areas."' In the
context of the qualified privilege, the courts weigh the public interest in maintaining
secrecy against the interests of the litigants in obtaining the information." 9
A. The State Secrets Privilege
The Supreme Court first articulated the unqualified state secrets privilege in
United States v. Reynolds2 ' in 1953, though the Court had "hinted at its existence"
before that.'2 ' In Reynolds, the widows of civilians killed in a military aircraft
accident sued the government in tort. 122 The deceased civilians had been aboard an
Air Force aircraft testing secret electronic equipment when the fatal accident
occurred. 23 The plaintiffs attempted to obtain the official report of the Air Force's
accident investigation. 124 In response, the Secretary of the Air Force formally
claimed that the report was privileged as a military secret. 25 The Court agreed with
the Air Force.'26
The Court set out the system for evaluating claims of the state secrets privilege.
The Supreme Court required "a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by
that officer.' 27 Such a claim is not conclusive, though, because "[j]udicial control
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers."' 121
secret services with the government, as the existence of a contract of
that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.
Id.
117 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 ("[E]ven the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.").
"' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,706 (1974) ("[N]either the doctrine of separation
of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can
sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process
under all circumstances.").
" See id. at 707.
120 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
121 J. Steven Gardner, Comment, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation:
A Proposalfor Statutory Relief 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 568 (1994). See also Totten,
92 U.S. at 107.
122 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2-3.
123 Id,
124 Id. at 3.
125 Id. at 3-5.
126 Id. at 10-11.
17 Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
12 Id. at 9-10.
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Rather, the courts must inquire into the circumstances of the claim.'29 If these
circumstances show "a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged,"'30 the claim is effective to block even an in camera inspection of the
evidence.'' In maintaining judicial control over evidence, the Court announced that
the necessity of the evidence will dictate the extent of the inquiry into the propriety
of the privilege claim.'32 A more searching inquiry is required if the need for the
evidence is great. 3 3 The Court noted, however, that "even the most compelling
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake."'34 The same rule applies for diplomatic and
national security secrets.33 Therefore, when a claim of privilege has been made by
the head of the relevant executive department, a court will determine whether the
circumstances show that diplomatic, military, or national security secrets are at risk.
If the court is satisfied that such secrets are at risk, the privilege is valid, and the
court cannot force disclosure.
B. The Qualified Privileges
The law is different for other claims of executive privilege. Such claims will
only prevail if the public interest in secrecy outweighs the litigants' interest in the
evidence. The deliberative privilege allows withholding of information used to help
the government make policy.136 The rationale behind the deliberative privilege is
that open and honest communication is best fostered where there is no danger that
the ideas exchanged will become public. 137 The privilege seeks to prevent a chilling
of candid opinions from advisors.
13
The law enforcement investigatory privilege protects information that could
harm law enforcement activities if revealed. This privilege ensures that confidential
informants remain confidential, that investigations are not compromised before their
conclusions, and that secret investigative methods are not revealed.
39
As a qualified privilege, the law enforcement investigatory privilege requires
that the need of a litigant for information be weighed against the public interest in
129 Id. at 10.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 11.
133 Id.
134 Id.
131 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1994) (noting that the rule "protect[s]
military, diplomatic, [and] sensitive national security secrets").
136 Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001).
137 Id. at 8-9.
138 Id.
131 In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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maintaining secrecy."° In balancing these interests, courts must consider a number
of factors, including the following:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental
processes by discouraging citizens from giving the government
information; (2) the impact upon persons who have given
information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree to
which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program
improvement will be chilled by disclosure; (4) whether the
information sought is factual data or evaluative summary; (5)
whether the party seeking discovery is an actual or potential
defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending or reason-
ably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any
interdepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may
arise from the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff's suit [if
the plaintiff is the party seeking discovery] is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is
available through other discovery or from other sources; (10) the
importance of the information sought to the . . . case [of the
party seeking discovery]. 4 '
The privilege takes into account the interests of the party seeking discovery, and
where those interests are strong the privilege is weaker. As with the deliberative
privilege, a claim of the qualified law enforcement investigatory privilege can only
succeed where a neutral judicial balance reveals that the public interest in
nondisclosure outweighs the litigants' interest in the information.'42
If there is a legitimate need to keep information secret, the law of executive privi-
lege maintains secrecy. The housekeeping statute and the regulations promugated
under it work hand-in-hand with executive privilege by providing a mechanism for
the centralized determination of whether to assert a claim of privilege. But the
housekeeping statute does not grant a privilege in itself.
III. PROBLEMS WITH MISUSE OF THE HOUSEKEEPING PRIVILEGE
Use of the housekeeping privilege, which is really no privilege at all, presents at
least three serious problems. First, the government of the United States is founded on
the principle of separation of powers, and control of evidence is a power that belongs
140 Tuite v. Henry, 98 F.3d 1411, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
141 Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 272).
142 Id.
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
to the courts. 43 Inasmuch as the housekeeping privilege allows executive agencies to
create their own privileges to withhold information from the courts, it allows the
executive branch to encroach on the legitimate province of the judiciary. 44 Second,
withholding of relevant evidence decreases the reliability of judicial determinations
of truth.' 45 Privileges, therefore, require strong justifications. The housekeeping
privilege allows withholding even in cases where no such justification supports with-
holding. This is particularly problematic in the context of criminal prosecutions
because it runs afoul of the criminal defendant's right to compulsory process. Finally,
the housekeeping privilege allows powerful executive agencies to flout the law of
privilege by creating their own privileges.'" If the concept of rule of law means
anything, it means that officers of one branch of the government cannot create a
separate law of privilege that applies to them.
A. Separation of Powers
The doctrine of separation of powers requires that the three branches of
government refrain from sharing their respective powers among themselves. In
United States v. Nixon, 147 the Supreme Court made this pronouncement about the
essential power of the judiciary to adjudicate claims of executive privilege:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the
others, the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the
federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be
shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for
example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the
Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a
Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to
the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and
balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government.
We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this
Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim of
privilege presented in this case. 4 '
143 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (holding that the judiciary has
the authority "'to say what the law is"' regarding privilege (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
44 See infra Part III.A.
45 See infra Part III.B.
146 See infra Part III.C.
'47 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
148 Id. at 704-05 (citations omitted).
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In United States v. Nixon, the President had claimed the right to conclusively deter-
mine what information was protected by the executive privilege for communications
with advisors.'49 The Supreme Court recognized, though, that it is the duty of the
judiciary to determine whether the purposes served by a privilege justify the harm
to the truth-seeking function of the courts in specific cases. 5 ' Separation of powers
would be undermined if the executive were allowed to balance the interest in the
privilege against the interest in truth-seeking, that is, if the executive were able to
say conclusively "what the law is" with respect to its own claims of privilege. 5'
Yet this is exactly what the housekeeping privilege purports to allow. It allows
executive agencies to write their own regulations for compliance with subpoenas
and to measure the lawfulness of their decisions not to comply by reference to their
own regulations. The law of privilege is to the contrary, though - it requires a
balancing of the interests served by a privilege against the interest in truth-
seeking.' If an agency determines not to comply with a subpoena, the agency's
decision is likely to receive judicial review, under the APA, only to determine
whether the decision complied with the agency's own regulations. Agency regu-
lations promulgated under the authority of the housekeeping statute are not ques-
tioned. Thus, the housekeeping privilege allows the executive branch to avoid a
judicial balancing of the interests served by a privilege to withhold evidence and the
149 Id. at 703.
150 See id. at 710 n. 18 ("'Limitations are properly placed upon the operation ofthis general
principle [the search for the truth] only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to
testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally
predominant principle ofutilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."' (quoting Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))); see also id. at 707.
The Court stated:
The impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in
the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do
justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function
of the courts under Art. III ....
Since we conclude that the legitimate needs of the judicial process
may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those
competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions
of each branch.
Id.
This doctrine does not apply with equal force in the context of civil lawsuits because the
judicial need for the information is not so great. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 124
S. Ct. 2576, 2589 (2004) ("The need for information for use in civil cases, while far from
negligible, does not share the urgency or significance of the criminal subpoena requests in
Nixon. As Nixon recognized, the right to production of relevant evidence in civil proceedings
does not have the same 'constitutional dimensions."') (citation omitted).
'5' Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-11.
152 Id. at 707.
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interest in truth-seeking. This permits the executive branch to usurp an essential
power of the judicial branch: the power to adjudicate claims of privilege.
B. "Derogation of the Search for Truth,,153
Privileges permit withholding relevant evidence and are, therefore, in
"derogation of the search for truth."' 54 For that reason, privileges require strong
justifications. The housekeeping privilege, however, allows withholding in
situations where there is no such justification. Naturally, this is problematic
inasmuch as it reduces the reliability of judicial determinations of truth.
This is especially troublesome, though, in the context of criminal prosecutions.
In Nixon, the Supreme Court recognized the strong interest in complete information
in the context of criminal prosecutions:
The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments
were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the
facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confi-
dence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence
needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.'55
Moreover, the Court noted that the criminal defendant's right to information is of
a constitutional level. 56 It is possible for the reasons supporting a privilege to be
sufficiently paramount, however, to overcome even this very strong need. But
because the housekeeping privilege allows an agency to conclusively determine to
withhold information without a neutral assessment of the interest in producing the
"' Id. at 710.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 709.
156 Id. at 711.
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly
has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers
upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor." Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also
guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those
guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and
admissible evidence be produced.
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information, the privilege allows withholding even where the sacrifice to the
judiciary's truth-seeking function eclipses the harm that would be done by
producing the information.157
C. Rule of Law
One of the foundational principles of this nation - indeed, of enlightened
government itself - is that law shall rule all men, including those who administer
the law. Ideally, neutral laws govern the actions of both leaders and citizens.
However, the housekeeping privilege contravenes this principle. Under that
supposed privilege, a federal agency may write its own law of privilege. That self-
written law may or may not comport with the real law of privilege. If it does not,
a suit under the APA will not provide a remedy unless the agency violated its own
law.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The housekeeping privilege "is not a privilege at all."' 8 For that reason, it
should not be effective to allow a federal agency to withhold evidence. Neverthe-
less, federal agencies frequently assert the housekeeping privilege as a justification
to withhold evidence subject to a subpoena.'59 In such situations, the only resort
may be an expensive, time-consuming action against the federal agency withholding
the evidence. This is a needless waste of resources. 60 Therefore, it would be wise
to allow courts faced with a refusal to produce subpoenaed evidence to consider the
"' This is not to say that agencies always decide to withhold information even when they
determine that the harm in releasing the information is outweighed by the benefit to the truth-
seeking function of a court. Indeed, the Department of Transportation's housekeeping
regulations state that agency counsel has the discretion to release information that would
otherwise not be released under the regulations if the release "is necessary to prevent a
miscarriage ofjustice." 49 C.F.R. § 9.1(c)(1) (2004).
158 Coleman, supra note 10, at 685.
"9 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
160 See NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co., 294 F.2d 868, 875 (5th Cir. 1961). The court explained
that the expense of formal requirements for obtaining review of an agency decision to
withhold was unjustified:
To require service of process on the N.L.R.B. would open the
possibility that some litigants would be deprived of the use of material,
unprivileged evidence; it would impose an additional and unnecessary
burden on parties seeking to obtain government records; it would lay
a trap for the unwary. It would do this without the slightest
compensating improvement in the disposition ofjustice.
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merits of such a refusal. This position is bolstered by the strong policy favoring
adjudication on the merits of a claim.
This is the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in National
Labor Relations Board v. Capitol Fish Co. "' The defendant in this unfair employ-
ment practices case secured a subpoena to examine the National Labor Relations
Board attorney who investigated the complaint.1 62 As instructed, the defendant
asked the general counsel of the Board to grant the attorney permission to testify. 1
63
The Board refused to allow the attorney to testify, however, and the attorney's
testimony was therefore not taken at the administrative hearing." The Fifth Circuit
held that privilege is the only real justification for a refusal to comply with a
subpoena.'65 Therefore, the court held
that when a party has filed a request for evidence or testimony
and the request can be properly denied only if the evidence or
testimony is privileged, the question of privilege is as squarely
raised by an unexplained refusal to comply as by an express
claim of privilege, and the court must decide the question.
1 66
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Reynolds,
which allowed adjudication of the merits of a claim of privilege despite the fact that
the head of the relevant department had not been named as the defendant. 167
This approach prevents abuses of the nonexistent housekeeping privilege. It
also allows the legitimate use of the housekeeping statute as a way to centralize the
decision to comply with, or object to, a subpoena.'68 Executive agency decision-
makers will not be deprived of the opportunity to raise objections to subpoenas.
With housekeeping regulations that require permission from an agency decision-
maker before information is produced, the appropriate decision-maker must first
decline to grant permission. Only then will a court consider possible claims of
privilege that might relieve the agency's obligation to comply with a subpoena. If
an agency wishes to raise its own claim of privilege, it is, of course, free to do so.
It is only in cases where an agency decision-maker has, without explanation, refused
to grant permission that this approach will make a difference.
161 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
162 Id. at 870.
163 Id. The Board's regulations prohibited testimony of Board employees without
permission from the Board itself or its General Counsel. Id. at 870 & n. 1.
'64 Id. at 870-71.
165 Id. at 874 ("In final analysis, justification for excluding government records rests on
privilege.").
166 Id. at 875.
167 Id. at 874.
168 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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This approach will also not affect valid claims of sovereign immunity. If a
refusal to comply is based on sovereign immunity, the court must consider the claim
of sovereign immunity. If sovereign immunity prevents enforcement of a subpoena,
the mere fact that there is no privilege to avoid the subpoena will not change the
outcome.
Finally, this approach would not turn agencies of the federal government into
"'speakers' bureau[s]"' for private litigants.'69 The federal discovery rules do not
allow excessively burdensome discovery.'70 Federal agencies under this approach
would have just as much right as any private entity to claim that discovery requests
are unduly burdensome. This proposal changes the current state of affairs somewhat
by ensuring that both sides are considered in a claim that a discovery request is
unduly burdensome. Currently, an agency may consider only its own interests in
determining that a discovery request would be too costly. This state of affairs
allows some litigants who have a strong need for information to be frustrated in their
attempts to obtain it, even where the cost to an agency of producing the information
is relatively low.
This proposed solution is better than the use of the APA because it allows
adjudication of the merits of a claim of privilege. In contrast, actions brought under
the APA only compare agency noncompliance with the agency's own regulations.' 7'
If noncompliance is rooted in the regulations, an APA action is unavailing. Review
of an incorrect agency determination to withhold will not invalidate that determina-
tion if the determination was made in accordance with agency regulations. The
suggested approach, by contrast, would invalidate a decision to withhold if that
decision was not based in law. This approach has another advantage over the APA:
it does not place the high costs of a separate action between a valid claim and relief
thereon.
Another approach would be necessary to combat the possibility that a federal
agency would adopt regulations that prohibit the release of all agency information
without regard to any possible privileges. An effective approach might merely de-
clare invalid a blanket refusal to disclose. While an agency employee cannot be
held in contempt of court for failure to comply, a court might nevertheless order an
agency to comply.
169 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted). The government feared that allowing private litigants discretion to call
government employees as witnesses in private litigation "will turn the federal government
into a 'speakers' bureau for private litigants."' Id. (citation omitted).
170 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
17' See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Federal agencies often claim the housekeeping privilege, which is really no
privilege at all.' 72 Derived from a statute that allows the agencies to issue reg-
ulations for the management of agency documents, the "privilege" is thought to
allow agencies to conclusively determine what information they will and will not
release to the courts in response to valid subpoenas. Invocations of the "privilege"
are most often based on a misstatement of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in
United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen.'73 Agencies claim that case granted them the
power to promulgate regulations that have the effect of creating evidentiary
privileges. Such claims were weakened significantly when Congress amended the
housekeeping statute to clarify that it did not justify withholding information.' 74 Nev-
ertheless, the "privilege" has persisted. Confusion among some courts as to the pro-
per interpretation of Touhy, along with the difficulty of challenging agency decisions
to defy subpoenas, have allowed this "privilege" to survive in fact if not in law.'75
The most widely accepted method of challenging an agency decision to
withhold information is through the APA. Unfortunately, though, the difficulty of
employing this method has been described as "'effectively eviscerat[ing]"" 76 the
right to the information. Moreover, a court reviewing agency actions under the APA
judges the action only against the touchstone of the agency's own policies. If the
agency's policies require withholding, the APA may not provide relief.'77
The law does grant the government special privileges to withhold information.
The executive branch has the privilege to maintain state secrets, even in the face of
a subpoena.'78 This privilege will be upheld no matter how strong the interest in
disclosure of the secret. The executive also has qualified privileges to withhold
information when the public interest in maintaining secrecy outweighs the judicial
interest in having all the relevant evidence.'79 This privilege recognizes that people
may refrain from giving the government confidential information if they fear that
information may become public. But there are some situations where the harm done
to the truth-seeking function of the courts by the preservation of confidentiality
would outweigh the harm done by the release of such information. In such cases,
the courts require the release of the information.
172 Coleman, supra note 10, at 685.
7 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
Congress very explicitly stated, "This section does not authorize withholding information
from the public or limiting the availability of records to the public." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
' See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text; supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
176 Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 780 n.1 1(9th Cir. 1994)
(quoting In re Boeh, 25 F.3d 761, 770 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., dissenting)).
17' The APA may allow a challenge to the agency's policies themselves, however. See
supra note 72.
178 See supra Part II.
179 See supra Part II.B.
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The housekeeping "privilege" subverts this principle, though, because it does
not allow the courts to weigh the interests in releasing information against the
interests in nondisclosure. It therefore impairs the truth-seeking function of the
judiciary even where the interest in maintaining secrecy does not justify such
impairment.' In arrogating to the executive branch the power to adjudicate claims
of privilege - a power that rightfully belongs to the judicial branch - the
housekeeping "privilege" thus violates the concept of separation of powers.' The
use of this "privilege" also detracts from the rule of law inasmuch as it allows
powerful federal agencies to avoid the reach of subpoenas despite the absence of any
legal right to do so.' 82
The courts should address these problems according to the rule articulated in
NLRB v. Capitol Fish Co.'83 Under that rule, courts would automatically consider
the merits of a real privilege whenever an executive agency attempts to rely on the
housekeeping "privilege."'"1 This approach would not risk disclosing secret
information where the interest in maintaining secrecy outweighs the interest in
disclosure. Courts will not fail to consider the justification for maintaining secrecy
in the way that agencies fail to consider the interest in disclosure. Indeed, courts are
the bodies that traditionally balance these interests. It is conceivable, of course, that
where an agency refuses to respond to a subpoena, a court will not understand the
agency's interest in confidentiality. In such a case, a court might erroneously
assume that the agency's interest in confidentiality is weaker than it is. But if a
court fails to take proper account of the government interest in secrecy, nothing
prevents the agency from making a formal claim of privilege stating the proper
interest in secrecy. Under this proposed solution, then, no legal interest in secrecy
is impaired, but the failure to consider appropriate interests in disclosure is remedied.
This proposal has the virtue of providing full consideration to both the interests
of the executive in secrecy and the interests of the judiciary in truth-seeking. The
proposal also prevents the obstacles of cost and time from becoming barriers to the
determination of the legal authority of an executive agency to ignore a subpoena.
Finally, the proposal would not require federal agencies to devote inordinate
resources to the production of information in response to subpoenas. The only
drawback is that agencies would lose the extra-legal ability to frustrate litigants
whose need for information (1) outweighs the government interest in secrecy, and
(2) outweighs the cost to the government of producing the information. Certainly,
the argument that federal agencies would like to continue to exercise authority that
they do not possess under law is not sufficient to overcome the benefits of this
proposal.
"8o See supra Part III.B.
181 See supra Part III.A.
i82 See supra Part III.C.
183 294 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1961).
14 See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
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